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The
Jury
Jury tampering by another name?
By EPHRAIM MARGOLIN
and GERALD F. UELMEN
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use of anonymous juries in criminal
trials presents a challenge to the fundamen, tal values protected by
the defendant's right to
a jury trial: the presumption of innocence, and the requirement of
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. It is important to understand
the extent to which these fragile
rights are burdened by jury anonymity so that effective safeguards can be
developed.
Juror anonymity is an innovation
that was unknown to the common
law and to American jurisprudence
in its first two centuries. Anonymity
was first employed in federal prosecutions of organized crime in New
York in the 1980s. Its use has spread
more recently to widely publicized
and volatile cases such as the federal
prosecution of police officers accused of beating Rodney King; the
1rowing
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trial of African American defendants
alleged to have beaten Reginald
Denny, a white truck driver, during
the riots after the first Rodney King
verdict; and the trial of those accused
of the fatal World Trade Center
bombing in New York City.
In some of these cases, the defense
offered no objection to use of an
anonymous jury. This judgment,
however, demands careful weighing
of anonymity's potentially harmful
impact on the defendant. The decision can be described as a "tactical
judgment" only where the court allows open-ended voir dire sufficiently meaningful to permit an informed judgment call. Most often,
the defense operates in a fog, and
preservation of anonymity posttrial
makes assessment of the process impossible.
Available evidence suggests that
anonymity may impose substantial
burdens on a jury's deliberative pro-

I

cess. Nevertheless, courts have allowed prosecutors to use this radical
innovation as a tactical ploy-despite the potentially increased
chances of conviction-without balancing the frequently unproven assertions of the prosecution against
the probability of harm for the defense and without requiring careful
monitoring and cautious scrutiny of
the process. A shroud of secrecy precludes any accumulation of data to
assess the impact of anonymity.
The showing necessary to justify
anonymity can be made routinely in
any case to which a prosecutor affixes an "organized crime" or "terrorism" label and attributes allegations of prior jury tampering to the
defendant by virtue of his or her
alleged control over "organized
crime" or "terrorist" affiliates.
There is an eerie parallel between
attempts in Northern Ireland to restrict the right to a jury trial in cases
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where terrorist crimes are alleged
and American use of juror anonymity in cases to which the "organized
crime" or "terrorism" label is applied. In both situations, the label becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, diminishing the procedural protections
available to the accused before the
label's accuracy has been determined.
An American tradition
The public nature of the jury trial
has been recognized since its inception. As the Supreme Court noted
in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior
Court of California, 464 U.S. 501,
505 (1984):
The roots of open trials reach
back to the days before the Norman Conquest when cases in England were brought before ...

a

town meeting kind of body ....

15 M
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Attendance was virtually compulsory on the part of the freemen of

court] may always sequester the
jury and change of venue is al-

the community ....

ways possible ....

Although the Supreme Court in
Press-Enterprise did not rely explic-

itly on the Sixth Amendment right to
a "speedy and public trial," the
Court nonetheless stated that there
has always been a "presumptive
openness of the jury selection process" and that "how we allocate the
'right' to openness as between the
accused and the public, or whether
we view it as a component inherent
in the system benefiting both, is not
crucial."
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, relying on Press-Enterprise and on the fact that historically "everybody knew everybody
on the jury," rejected jury anonymity in In re Baltimore Sun, 841 F.2d

74, 76-77 (4th Cir. 1988):
We think it no more than application of what has always been
the law to require a district court
... to release the names and addresses of those jurors who are sitting ....

We recognize the diffi-

culties which may exist in highly
publicized trials ... and the pres-

sures upon jurors. But we think
the risk of loss of confidence in
the judicial process is too great to
permit a criminal defendant to be
tried by a jury whose members
may maintain anonymity. If...
the attendant dangers of a highly
publicized trial are too great, [the
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The Fourth Circuit is not alone in
having reached this conclusion. The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts recently reversed an organized crime defendant's conviction
for being an accessory to first-degree
murder on the ground that he was
deprived of his right to know the
prospective jurors' names and addresses. (Commonwealth v. Angiulo,

415 Mass. 502 (1993).) Although the
ruling was based on a statutory right
to a jury list in capital cases (Mass.
Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 277, § 66 (West
1990)), the court noted the common
law origin of the requirement and
the constitutional limitations on the
use of anonymous juries even in
noncapital cases.
A two-hundred-year-old federal
statute requires the prosecution to
furnish any defendant charged with
a capital offense with "a list of the
veniremen ... stating the place of

abode of each venireman" at least
three full days before the commencement of trial. (18 USC § 3432
(Supp. 1992).) One century ago, the
U.S. Supreme Court declared that
compliance with the statute's provisions is mandatory, even when the
defendant is acquitted of a capital
charge and convicted of a lesser offense. (Logan v. United States, 144

U.S. 263 (1892).)
More recent cases have declared
that the right arises from the nature
of the charges, even if the prosecution does not intend to seek the
death penalty, and that failure to
comply with the statutory requirement is "plain error." (Amsler v.
United States, 381 F.2d 37 (9th Cir.
1967); United States v. Crowell, 442

F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1971).) Thus, the
empanelment of an anonymous jury
is precluded in capital cases in federal court.
The primary justification for using
an anonymous jury is to foreclose
any opportunity for jury tampering
by the defendant or the defendant's
associates. The motivation for and
risk of such behavior is at its height
in capital cases, yet Congress has
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determined that alternatives other
than anonymity must be employed
to protect the jurors' safety and their
deliberations in such cases.
The 1990 restoration of a federal
death penalty creates a serious
anomaly in cases that permit use of
anonymous juries. Jurors' identities
may be kept from an "organized
crime" defendant accused of drug
trafficking but not from a defendant
accused of murdering a police officer who sought to arrest the defendant for drug trafficking.
Organized crime
The anonymous jury has become
a hallmark of organized crime cases.
In recent years, it has been transformed from a rare and unusual
"last resort" into a standard tactical
weapon in the prosecutorial quiver.
The obvious effect of its employment was noted by John Markham,
a former federal prosecutor: "[An
anonymous jury] ominously signals
the jurors that you are so dangerous
that you cannot even be trusted with
their names." (2(8) California State
Bar Bull. 1 (June 1992).)
The prejudice that a defendant
suffers when tried by an anonymous
jury is not unlike the prejudice suffered by a defendant who is gagged
and shackled in the courtroom. The
cases upholding the use of courtroom restraints in the presence of a
jury make it clear that the defendant's own personal courtroom conduct is the only trigger that can justify this burden on his or her rights.
In Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337

(1970), the Court conceded that the
sight of shackles and a gag might
have a significant effect on the jury's
attitude toward the defendant, but it
upheld the practice to control a disruptive defendant. As the Court later
explained in Estelle v. Williams, 425

U.S. 501, 505 n.2 (1976): "The contumacious defendant brings this
plight upon himself and presents the
court with a limited range of alternatives. Obviously, a defendant
cannot be allowed to abort a trial
and frustrate the process of justice
by his own acts."
Criminal Justice
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Personal accountability for any
danger to the jury should similarly
be the linchpin to justify juror anonymity in any case, whether or not
an "organized crime" connection
can be made. As the court stated in
United States v. Vario, 943 F.2d 236,
241 (2d Cir. 1991):
The invocation of the words "organized crime," "mob," or "Mafia," unless there is something
more, does not warrant an anonymous jury. This "something
more" can be a demonstrable history or likelihood of obstruction of
justice on the part of the defendant or others acting on his behalf
or a showing that trial evidence
will depict a pattern of violence
by the defendants and his associates such as would cause a juror
to reasonably fear for his own
safety.

Terrorism
There is a strong parallel between
the use of anonymous juries in organized crime cases and their use in
cases involving terrorism. The stated
concern is to protect jurors from interference or retaliation by those
who may be affiliated with the defendants.
Similar concerns, however, led to
the complete abrogation of the right
to a jury trial in Northern Ireland for
those accused of terrorist activity.
Under the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1973,
"Diplock" courts were established
to try such defendants without a
jury. The fairness of Diplock courts
has been called into question. Some
have attributed the reduced acquittal rate to "case hardened" judges
who hear a regular procession of
cases alleging terrorism and to the
frequency with which judges decide
both the admissibility of confessions
and the guilt or innocence of the defendant in the same case.
A proposal to restore the right to a
jury trial in terrorist cases in
Northern Ireland included a recommendation that jurors remain anonymous. It suggested that jurors could
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be transported to court in buses and
concealed from public view behind
a curtain or screen; neither defense
nor prosecution lawyers would be
given jurors' names or addresses.
In rejecting this proposal, the
Standing Advisory Commission on
Human Rights (a public body in
Northern Ireland established to advise the government on criminal justice and human rights matters) concluded that it probably would be
impossible to maintain anonymity
during a lengthy trial. In addition,
the commission felt that "it is important in any trial by jury for the defendant to be able to object to some
members of the jury panel; this right
could not be properly exercised
without some information as to the
jurors' identity."
Ironically, the commission concluded that no jury trial at all was
preferable to using an anonymous
jury. This conclusion underscores
the uncertainty surrounding anonymity's effect on jury selection and
deliberations. To what extent can a
defendant's historical right to a jury
trial be compromised before total
elimination of the use of a jury becomes a preferable alternative?
Corrective jury instructions
The potential burden of jury anonymity on the defendant's presumption of innocence was conceded in
United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d
1359 (2d Cir. 1985). It was even recognized that the prejudicial impact
on the defendant could not be eliminated totally.
In rejecting a per se rule against
anonymity, the Thomas court underlined two essential prerequisites for
use of an anonymous jury. First,
there should be "strong reason to
believe the jury needs protection,"
and second, reasonable precaution
must be taken to minimize the negative effect of use of the anonymous
jury "on the jurors' opinions of the
defendants."
Unfortunately, the court also endorsed concealing from the jury the
real reason for anonymity. The principal justification offered for ano-
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nymity was to prevent jury tampering, but the court approved an
instruction that deliberately made
no mention of that, only of the necessity to protect jurors from "unwanted and undesirable publicity
and embarrassment and notoriety
and any access to you which would
interfere with preserving your sworn
duty to fairly, impartially and independently serve as jurors."
Cases following Thomas have carried this skewing of motivation to
even greater heights. In United
States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015 (3d
Cir. 1988), the court justified anonymity because evidence describing
the defendant's organized crime
connection might have led jurors to
fear for their safety and that of their
families. At the same time, the court
approved a jury instruction as follows:
I want to emphasize very strongly
that this in no way suggests that
the defendant would ever have
dreamed of interfering with you or
your family. I have been a judge
now for 27 years, and in all that
time I have never heard of a case
where any defendant ever tried to
cause harm to a juror or a member of the juror's family.
The judge's recollection was accurate: Physical injury to a juror has
been traced to a defendant in only
one case, United States v. Bentvena,
319 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1963). It is
nonetheless unrealistic to expect
that jurors will avert their natural
suspicion from the most obvious
source of danger in the courtroom
based on this admonishment.
Juries are well aware of the fact
that anonymity is reserved for cases
involving threats to their safety, and
such threats are frequently attributed
to "organized crime" defendants.
As Judge Robert Gardner put it, "A
juror is not some kind of dithering
nincompoop, brought in from
never-never land and exposed to the
harsh realities of life for the first time
in the jury box." (People v. Long, 38
Cal. App. 3d 687, 689 (1974).)
The Scarfo court conceded that a
corrective instruction is a "subterfuge which conceal[s] the actual
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reason for preserving anonymity."
But it went on to say that "juries are
not fooled by such subterfuge, and
are actually more likely to draw
prejudicial inferences about defendants from speculation as to the reasons for their anonymity than from
actual knowledge of those reasons."
Alan Dershowitz of Harvard University has said more bluntly that
"lying to the jury is contagious and
does not fool anyone. Judges who
lie to juries undermine the system of
justice more than does any fear of
possible jury tampering." (Nat'l L. J.
at 22, col. 4 (Nov. 2, 1987).)

Nothing corrodes the criminal
justice system more than routine judicial sanctioning of jury instructions that the judges themselves
have no evidence to support. Sanitized instructions to the jury cannot
disguise the fact that anonymity is
predicated on the real risk of jury
tampering. It must be assumed that
jurors recognize this risk and that it
will ultimately affect their attitude
toward the defendant and their deliberations regarding guilt or innocence.
Tell jurors the truth: There was evidence of jury tampering in some
other organized crime cases and,
while neither the attorney nor the
defendant involved in those cases is
the same as those involved in the
present case, precautions are being
taken to ensure the jurors' protection. Less harm will be done than if
the jury is presented with false concerns about the media and left to
speculate as to the horrendous
crimes the defendant might have,
but in fact had not, committed.
Sequestration
Concerns that trial publicity might
enhance the possibility of juror harassment can ordinarily be dealt
with by means short of an anonymous jury. Sequestration of jurors,
for example, may be justified, but
sequestration and anonymity need
not go hand in hand. If the real concern is to "ward off curiosity" and
shelter the jurors from interference
with performing their sworn duty,

sequestration itself accomplishes
these goals. Anonymity adds nothing.
Some prosecutors argue that sequestration will not protect a juror's
family from threats. This argument
has no factual predicate, because
there simply is no recorded example
of such threats ever being communicated to the family of a sequestered juror. Nonetheless, such conjecture will sound plausible in any
case where a risk of jury tampering
is held to be likely because of the
defendant's alleged organized crime
or terrorist affiliations.
To protect jurors from the importunate media even after their jury
service is concluded, courts can
fashion protective orders that prohibit repeated interview requests
and questioning about statements
made by jurors other than the juror
who has agreed to an interview. (See
United States v. Antar, 839 F. Supp.
293 (D. N.J. 1993); Abraham S.
Goldstein, Jury Secrecy and the Media: The Problems of Postverdict Interviews, U. Ill. L. Rev. 295 (1993).)
Notably, sequestration adds substantially to the aura of fear created
by the use of an anonymous jury. It
increases the risk that jurors will attribute the burdens imposed on
them to threats made by the defendant. Courts must guard against an
"ostensible display of unusual precaution which might have been interpreted as singling out the defendants as ... particularly dangerous
or guilty persons." (Hardee v. Kuhlman, 581 F.2d 330, 332 (2d Cir.
1978).)
In the federal trial of John Gotti,
the order of sequestration imposed a
security regimen on the jurors comparable to incarceration in Marion
Federal Prison. Marshals were ordered to accompany jurors on visits
to church, doctors' offices, barber or
beauty shops, and stores. They monitored all telephone conversations
between jurors and family members
and censored all incoming mail.
Even visits by jurors with their
spouse or children were monitored
by marshals.
Standard 19 of the American Bar
Association Standards Relating to Ju-
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ror Use and Management notes the
risks of sequestration: reduced representativeness of the panel, an altered deliberative process, and jurors' resentment. This last risk, the
standards emphasize, means that
"neither the judge nor counsel
should disclose to the jury which
party requested sequestration."
Where anonymity accompanies sequestration, it will of course be obvious to the jury who made sequestration necessary.
Juries were not sequestered in at
least two Second Circuit cases employing anonymous juries where
there was a substantial showing of
risk of jury tampering. In United
States v. Ferguson, 758 F.2d 843 (2d
Cir. 1985), marshals drove the jurors
home at night. In United States v.
Persico, 832 F.2d 705 (2d Cir.
1987), marshals simply transported
jurors to an undisclosed central location from which they departed for
home.
Unlike anonymity, sequestration
by itself can be explained plausibly
to jurors as necessary to protect
them from the media-from both
improper attempts to contact them
and accidental exposure to prejudicial news reports. That explanation
is seriously undercut, however,
when sequestration is accompanied
by anonymity.
When the need to protect jurors
from overly persistent media is obvious, a defendant may believe that
an anonymous jury clearly is a preferable alternative to sequestration
and that jurors will not assume the
anonymity suggests that the defendant poses some danger to them.
This apparently was the conclusion
reached by the police officer defendants in the second Rodney King
trial, given that the defense offered
no objection to the use of an anonymous jury.
The circumstances under which a
defendant would be willing to waive
his or her right to learn the identities
of the jurors are quite limited, however. Even when circumstances are
right, the defense may want to suggest a compromise in which the jurors' identities are given only to the
(Continued on page 60)
Criminal Justice

HeinOnline -- 9 Crim. Just. 18 1994-1995

CHARLES C THOMAS 4o PUBLISHER
E- Hendricks, James E, & Bryan Byers-MULTICUL-

O Johann, Sara Lee-DOMESTIC ABUSERS: Terror-

isis in Our Homes. '94, 152 pp. (7 x 10)., $35.75
This book, written by a nationally known author
and attorney, is for an audience which includes
both professionals who work with domestic violence cases and the general public, with a special
emphasis on encouraging battered women to seek
help in ending violent and/or otherwise abusive relationships with their mates. DOMESTIC ABUSERS:
Terrorists in Our Homes deals with training professionals in handling domestic abuse cases and would
be appropriate as a text in courses in criminal
justice, sociology, social work, law, police sciences,
women's 9udies, human relations, nursing/medical,
and education. It would also be very useful as a
text for one-day seminars on this topic. Contents
include: The "look" of a woman abused by her
mate; characteristics of battered women; living
with an abusive mate; what is "love"?; the police
and domestic violence cases; prosecution of domestic violence cases; exposing the violence; what to
do when he won't leave; networking among professionals; the impact on children; how to isolate
domestic violence; battered women who kill their
abusers; pardons and wrongful imprisonment of
battered women; and other topics.

TURAL PERSPECTIVES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND
CRIMINOLOGY. '94, 534 pp. (7 x 10), 18 tables.

This all-inclusive, easily readable, practical, up-todate, important text addresses cultural diversity,
criminal justice, and criminology with such issues
as gender, race, ethnicity, and sexuality. Types of
crime, juvenile justice issues, training and college
curricula are addressed. In recent years there has
been greatly increasing attention to these themeswhich are represented here by twenty-one national
scholars with a thorough expertise and unique
perspective in bridging multiculturalism, criminal
justice, and criminology. At times the authors seem
to agree on topics and issues, while at other times
the perspectives may seem divergent, adding significance to this work's emphasis on perspectives,
to cover the gap between research and practice.
"l Kenney, John P., Donald E. Fuller & Robert F.BarryPOLICE WORK WITH JUVENILES AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE. (8th Ed.)
'95, 358 pp. (7 x 10).
El Palermo, George B.-THE FACES OF VIOLENCE.
'94, 342 pp. (7 x 10), 4 tables.
0l Brill, Norman Q.-AMERICA'S PSYCHIC MALIGNANCY: The Problem of Crime, Substance Abuse,
Poverty and Welfare- Identifying Causes with Possible Remedies. '93, 150 pp. (7 x 10), S29.75.

o

Spitz, Werner U.-Spitz and Fisher's MEDICOLEGAL INVESTIGATION OF DEATH: Guidelines for
the Application of Pathology to Crime Investigation. (3rd Ed.) '93, 856 pp. (81/ x 11), 866 il.,
29 tables, $84.75.

0 Paull, Donald-FITNESS TO STAND TRIAL. '93,
196 pp. (7 x 10), 3 il., $49.75.

o

Furnish, Brendan F. J. and Dwight H. SmallTHE MOUNTING THREAT OF HOME INTRUDERS:
Weighing the Moral Option of Armed Self-Defense.
'93, 274 pp. (7 x 10), $54.75.

o

Franklin, Carl J.-THE POLICE OFFICER'S GUIDE
TO CIVIL LIABILITY. '93, 298 pp. (7 x 10), 18 il.,
$55.75.

El Fisher, Ronald P. & R. E. Geiselman-MEMORYENHANCING TECHNIQUES FOR INVESTIGATIVE
INTERVIEWING: The Cognitive Interview. '92, 232
pp. (7 x 10), 1 table, $49.75.

o
o

Johann, Sara Lee & Frank Osanka- REPRESENTING
... BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL. '89, 416 pp.
(7 x 10) $78.50.
Vito, Gennaro F., Edward J. Latessa & Deborah G.
Wilson-INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE
RESEARCH METHODS. '88, 226 pp. (7 x 10), 5 iI.,
$42.25.

El Vandenberg, Gerald H.-COURT TESTIMONY IN
MENTAL HEALTH: A Guide for Mental Health Professionals and Attorneys. '93, 162 pp. (7 x 10),
$32.75.
O Covey, Herbert C., Scott Menard and Robert J.
Franzese-JUVENILE GANGS. '92, 306 pp. (7 x
10), 4 il., $54.75.

O3 Mahoney, Paul T.--NARCOTICS INVESTIGATION

TECHNIQUES. '92, 406 pp. (7 x 10), 37 il., $66.75.

O3 Robinson, Cyril D.-LEGAL RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND

LIABILITIES OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE PERSONNEL:
History and Analysis (2nd Ed.). '92, 516 pp. (7 x 10),
5 tables, $73.75.

O Felkenes, George T., and Peter Charles UnsingerDIVERSITY, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND LAW ENFORCEMENT. '92, 224 pp. (7 x 10), $42.75.

o- Surette,

Ray-THE MEDIA AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY: Recent Research and Social Effects.
'90, 332 pp. (7 x 10), 7 il., 21 tables, $58.25.

0 Harries, Keith D.-SERIOUS VIOLENCE: Patterns
of Homicide and Assault in America. '90, 238 pp.
(7 x 10), 23 il., 32 tables, $43.75.

o

Wenke, Robert A.-THE ART OF SELECTING A
JURY. (2nd Ed.) '89, 158 pp. (5 x 81), $36.25.

o Golec,

Anthony M.-TECHNIQUES OF LEGAL
INVESTIGATION. (2nd Ed.) '85, 522 pp. (63/ x
93/), 140 il., $58.75.

Write, call (for Visa or MasterCard) 1-800-258-8980 or 1-217-789-8980 or FAX (217) 789-9130
Books sent on approval * Complete catalog sent on request * Prices subject to change without notice
260SuhFrtSre

pi

i

*

Ilini

HeinOnline -- 9 Crim. Just. 19 1994-1995

*

627

4-96

been formally charged. The police
are under no Fifth Amendment duty
either to let the lawyer communicate with Desperado or to inform
the suspect of the lawyer's presence.
Indeed, police may even stall in
order to gain a tactical advantage,
although this practice is not
encouraged.
Under the Sixth Amendment,
Desperado is not entitled to see
counsel-without first requesting
counsel-before he is formally
charged. (Moran v. Burbine, 475
U.S. 412 (1986); Mitchell v. State,
816 S.W.2d 566 (Ark. 1991).) A caveat: Some states will suppress confessions when police refuse to
cooperate with counsel under the
foregoing scenario. (People v. JohnApp. 3d
son, 570 N.E.2d 400 (111.
Dist. 1991).)
A Miranda meltdown?
The Miranda rules are complex.
Ironically, the Supreme Court's intent in promulgating the rules was to
clarify judicial review guidelines. As
the court recently commented:
[T]he police do not need our assistance to establish ...

[interro-

gation guidelines]; they are free, if
they wish, to adopt [guidelines]
on their own. Of course it is our
task to establish guidelines for ju-

Anonymous Jury
(Continued from page 18)
participating attorneys and not disclosed to the public or even to the
defendants.
Application of a standard that
equates and combines anonymity
and sequestration poses grave risks
to defendants. The courts should delineate clearly when sequestration is
appropriate, when anonymity may
be employed, and in what limited
circumstances anonymity and sequestration may be combined.
Being an anonymous juror
Unquestionably, with the increasing use of anonymous juries, the

dicial review. We like them to be
"clear and unequivocal," . . . but
only when they guide sensibly,
and in a direction we are authorized to go.
(McNeil v. Wisconsin, 111 S. Ct. at
2211 (emphasis in original; citation
omitted).)
There clearly are a multitude of
ways that the police and prosecutors
may bend the rules. Given the Supreme Court's desire for sensible directives, is Miranda headed for a
meltdown? Before long, the sole
clear and unequivocal judge-made
guideline may revolve around the
good faith of the police interrogator
and the voluntariness of the suspect.
This prognostication is not baseless.
In Connelly, 479 U.S. at 166, the
court arguably foreshadowed the
application of good faith analysis to
interrogations and confessions by
citing to a prior good faith exception
case (albeit in the search warrant
context) and pointing out that the
purpose of the Miranda exclusionary rule is to deter law enforcement
misconduct.
It is even possible that 18 USC
§ 3501 (enacted as Title II of the
Omnibus Safe Streets and Crime
Control Act, 82 Stat. 197 (1968))
overrules Miranda, at least in federal
court. (See U.S. v. Alvarez-Sanchez,
128 L. Ed. 2d 319 (1994), holding
that § 3501 applies only to persons
I-_--4t,

courts are engaged in a "grand experiment" with the traditional safeguards of the American right to jury
trial. A true experiment, however,
requires careful measurement and
assessment of this new variable's
impact on jury selection and deliberation. Ironically, the very protection provided by anonymity forecloses access to the most accurate
means of assessing the experiment's
outcome: postverdict debriefing of
the jurors themselves.
First impressions. The research of
social psychologists and others who
have studied jurors' behavior
strongly suggests that anonymity
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charged with federal crimes.) The
statute appears to mandate that only
involuntary confessions shall be excluded. Thus, the argument goes,
Congress's intent is that voluntary
statements obtained in technical violation of Miranda are admissible.
(See, e.g., Justice Antonin Scalia's
concurring opinion in Davis, 55
Crim. L. Rptr at 2209-10, lamenting
the government's failure to raise the
argument; U.S. v. Robinson, 439
F.2d 553, 574 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(McGowen, J., dissenting).)
Few commentators expected the
Supreme Court's adoption of the
"threshold" standard in Davis.
Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and
Antonin Scalia seem interested in
the apparent conflict between Miranda and § 3501. (See oral argument summary in Davis, 55 Crim. L.
Rptr 3011 (1994).) Thus, the Supreme Court appears poised to retreat from the rigidity and confusion
of the Miranda rules.
Given that the American public
today is as familiar with the Miranda
warnings as with the pledge of allegiance, the time has come to return
to a voluntariness test-a test which,
as espoused in § 3501, takes into
consideration the suspect's knowledge of his or her "rights" but does
not render this knowledge (or lack
thereof) conclusive on the issue of
C
voluntariness or admissibility.
'+++
L t

poses grave risks to some of the fundamental values that underlie trial
by jury. Research confirms the powerful influence of each juror's first
impression of a defendant and the
impact that the array of first opinions
has on the jury's subsequent evaluation of evidence and deliberations,
thereby burdening the presumption
of innocence. Jurors holding a minority view are more easily swayed
toward the impressions held by the
larger faction than vice versa. (Valerie P. Hans and Neil Vidmar, Judging the Jury 110 (Plenum, 1986).)
When the first impression is
strongly negative, jurors may resolve
Criminal Justice
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close issues of evidentiary dispute,
such as the credibility of witnesses,
much differently than they would
have otherwise. The phenomenon
was noted by Harry Kalven Jr. and
Hans Zeisel in their classic study,
The American Jury 114, 165 (Little,
Brown, 1966):
The jury does not often consciously and explicitly yield to
sentiment in the teeth of the law.
Rather, it yields to sentiment in
the apparent process of resolving
doubts as to evidence. The jury,
therefore, is able to conduct its revolt from the law within the etiquette of resolving issues of fact.
In an influential simulated jury
study, it was found that characterizing the defendant as "a notorious
gangster and syndicate boss who
had been vying for power in the
syndicate controlling the state's underworld activities" made a significant difference in trial outcome
compared to a case where identical
evidence was presented against a
more sympathetic defendant. (David
Landy and Elliot Aronson, The Influence of the Character of the Criminal
and His Victim on the Decisions of
Simulated jurors, 5 J. Experimental
Soc. Psychology 141 (1969).)
Another simulation study revealed
that the entire nature of the deliberative process was affected by revealing a defendant's prior conviction,
even when there was an instruction
to disregard that fact except in assessing the defendant's credibility.
When a prior conviction was
brought to the jurors' attention, they
were more likely to discuss matters
that hurt the defendant's case and
more likely to think that the various
pieces of evidence presented by the
prosecution were strong. (Gordon
Bermant, Charlan Nemeth, and Neil
Vidmar, eds., Psychology and the
Law: Research Frontiers 135, 142
(Lexington, 1976).)
Once the seeds of suspicion are
planted by the use of juror anonymity, the jurors may attribute sinister
implications to the defendant's
courtroom appearance and de-

meanor. In Angiulo, supra, the jurors, who had been impaneled
anonymously, complained during
the trial that the defendant was giving them the "whammy" or "evil
eye" and was writing down information about them. There was no
finding that the defendant attempted
to intimidate jurors by unusual eye
contact.
jury instructions may do more
harm than good. Reliance on jury
instructions to dispel the prejudicial
impression of the defendant created
by anonymity may have a boomerang effect. Numerous experiments
have shown that restrictive instructions may backfire by magnifying
the influence of the very factors that
jurors were exhorted to ignore.
One such study found that jurors
deliberating in groups and then rendering individual judgments were
harsher in convicting and sentencing after they were given specific instructions to "decide on the disputed facts without regard to [the
unfavorable] non-evidential aspects
of the defendant." (Cheryl J. Oros
and Donald Elman, Impact ofJudge's
Instructions upon Jurors' Decisions:
The "Cautionary Charge" in Rape
Trials, 10 Representative Research
in Soc. Psych. 28 (1979).)
Hidden in the crowd. A second
major concern arises from psychological research on "deindividuation," a phenomenon described by
Philip Zimbardo, a leading professor
of psychology at Stanford University. According to Zimbardo, when
an individual feels increasingly
anonymous under conditions that
serve to minimize self-observation
and, particularly, concern over evaluation by others, he or she tends to
behave in ways that reflect a "lowered threshold of normally restrained behavior." (Monte M. Page,
ed., Nebraska Symposium on Motivation: Personality, Current Theory,
and Research, 240, 251 (Univ. of
Nebraska Press, 1983).)
The impact of this phenomenon
on the deliberations of a jury produces the precise opposite of the rational, responsible decision making
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we strive for in our American system

of justice:
Virtually by definition, deindividuated behavior must have the
property of being a high intensity
manifestation of behavior which
observers would agree is emotional, impulsive, irrational, regressive, or atypical for the person
in the given situation.
(Id. at 251.)
Creating anonymity in laboratory
experiments on small-group behavior (measuring subjects' willingness
to deliver electric shocks to innocent victims), Zimbardo documented that "[c]onditions which induce feelings of remoteness lead to
lowered self-consciousness, less embarrassment, and reduced inhibitions about punishing the victim."
(Id. at 270.) Thus, by increasing the
risk of emotional, impulsive, and irrational decision making, the "deindividuation" of anonymity may dilute the protection provided by
requiring proof of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Safeguards needed
Anonymity presents substantial
risks to the traditional deliberative
processes of American juries. The research of social psychologists suggests that these risks could include
both an undermining of the presumption of innocence and a dilution of
the proof standard. The combination
of anonymity with sequestration simply compounds these risks.
The restoration of a federal death
penalty in the face of a two-centuryold statutory requirement that capital defendants receive the names
and addresses of jury veniremen in
advance creates a serious anomaly
that cries out for reassessment of the
costs and benefits of allowing juror
anonymity. The use of anonymous
juries should be suspended or carefully circumscribed until safeguards
are devised to prevent these undesirable effects.
CJ
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